Lingnan University

Digital Commons @ Lingnan University
Conference on China and Global Climate
Change : Reconciling International Fairness and
Protection of the Atmospheric Commons

Day 1 : Climate Change Diplomacy and
International Justice

Jun 18th, 2:00 PM - 3:30 PM

Climbing the Great Wall : how the interplay between China and the
United States will affect mitigation in a Kyoto successor treaty
Elizabeth DINELLO
University of Denver Sturm College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.ln.edu.hk/climate_change_conf
Part of the Environmental Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Dinello, E. (2009). Climbing the Great Wall: How the interplay between China and the United States will
affect mitigation in a Kyoto successor treaty. In China and global climate change: Proceedings of the
conference held at Lingnan University, Hong Kong, 18-19 June 2009 (pp. 206-221). Centre for Asian
Pacific Studies and the Environmental Studies Programme, Lingnan University, Hong Kong.

This Discussion is brought to you for free and open access by the Centre for Asian Pacific Studies 亞洲太平洋研究
中心 (Ceased publication from Jan 2021) at Digital Commons @ Lingnan University. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Conference on China and Global Climate Change : Reconciling International Fairness and Protection of
the Atmospheric Commons by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Lingnan University.

Climbing The Great Wall:
How The Interplay Between China And The United States Will Affect Mitigation In A
Kyoto Successor Treaty
Elizabeth Dinello1
Abstract
China and the United States have the ability to radically shape a successor treaty to the Kyoto
Protocol. China’s placement as a non-Annex I nation under the Kyoto Protocol has had
significant negative consequences for climate change, and China is now the top emitter of
greenhouse gases in the world. The United States has thus far refused to sign the Kyoto
Protocol. China will not sign a Kyoto successor treaty unless the United States is on board
and vice versa. If either party is uncooperative in negotiating a successor treaty, there will be
no effective treaty. The Kyoto Protocol has in large part failed because of the roles China
and the United States have played.
This paper will discuss how the interplay between China and the United States will
affect mitigation in a Kyoto successor treaty. This paper argues that China and the United
States must agree to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to eighty percent below 1990 levels by
2050. First, this paper will discuss basic climate change science, focusing on what the
experts say greenhouse gases (including carbon dioxide) and temperature must be stabilized
at as well as the mitigation measures necessary to achieve those stabilization goals. Second,
this paper will summarize what happened at the Bali and Poznan conferences and how those
two meetings set the stage for Copenhagen in 2009. Third, this paper will outline the
necessary framework for mitigation in a Kyoto successor treaty. Fourth, this paper will
address the challenges of implementing a Kyoto successor treaty in the United States and in
China. Lastly, this paper will discuss how the world, and in particular the United States and
China, is reacting and could react to mitigating climate change in light of the current
economic crisis. With the recent approval of Todd Stern as the United States Special Envoy
for Climate Change and the March 2008 elevation of China’s State Environmental Protection
Agency into a Cabinet ministry, both nations are now in the position to cooperate and lead
the rest of the world in negotiating a successful Kyoto successor treaty.
Introduction
“My dear ones, your generation will face a series of environmental challenges that will dwarf
anything any previous generation has confronted,” the Udalls wrote to their grandchildren.2
They then pointed out that the United States (U.S.) and China are responsible for forty
percent of carbon dioxide emissions and that “consequently these two nations have a moral
responsibility to be in the forefront of any global campaign to develop new technologies to
cut the emissions of this damaging pollutant.”3 Stewart Udall, a former Secretary of Interior,
“regrettably voted…for the Interstate Highway Program…act[ing] on the shortsighted
assumption that cheap oil was super-abundant and would always be available…it haunts
America today.”4 The U.S. has made a big mistake, and now China is following in America’s
footsteps. Americans are at fault, and we must take responsibility for our actions and make
things right. Many rural Chinese strive to emulate the affluent lifestyle of Americans. Wu
Yiebing and his wife, Cao Waiping, moved from a rural mountain village to Hanjing, and are
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dependent on their new coal-supported lifestyle: “…they have tasted the rising standard of
living from coal-generated electricity and they are hooked, even as they suffer the vivid
effects of the damage their new lifestyle creates.”5 As Zhang Jianyu, program manager of
Beijing’s Office of Environmental Defense put it, “ ‘The fundamental problem is that China
is following the path of the United States, and probably the world cannot afford a second
United States.’ ”6
The Kyoto Protocol (Kyoto) has failed. Under Kyoto, developed nations were
supposed to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by five percent below 1990 levels. Not
only have developed nations as a whole not reduced their emissions, they have actually
increased their emissions. Professor Gwyn Prins points out that the European Union (EU), at
the helm of Kyoto, actually increased its emissions by ten percent. 7 In an earlier article
Professor Prins and Steve Raynor argued that Kyoto “failed…not just in its lack of success in
slowing global warming, but also because it has stifled discussion of alternative policy
approaches that could both combat climate change and adapt to its unavoidable
consequences.”8 They insist that the “rational thing to do in the face of a bad investment is to
cut your losses and try something different.”9 In an open letter to Barack Obama, journalist
Michael Page points out that “Kyoto is noble but ineffective” and encourages Obama to
abandon his cap and trade plan in favor of a tax-and-dividend system.10 Since Obama has
already pledged support for a cap-and-trade system, a carbon tax is unrealistic at this time.
Kyoto has in large part failed because of the roles China and the U.S. have played.
Under the Bush administration, the U.S. refused to sign Kyoto. Bush consistently
complained that China “was entirely exempted from the requirements in the Kyoto
Protocol.”11 Bush also argued that “mandatory reductions in emissions will undermine the
American economy…”12 Eight years later, the American economy is in a shambles and the
American people are angry—very angry at Mr. Bush. China has continued to follow
America’s lead in terms of economic development. Significant negative environmental
consequences have come with this development. Professor Paul G. Harris argues that “the
most profound environmental consequence of these developments is China’s contribution to
climate change.”13 Americans have set a horrible example for the Chinese. The U.S. has
made the situation even worse by failing to take a leadership role in the global climate change
arena and by failing to act at all. Even though the Chinese are racing to catch up to the
Americans’ affluent lifestyles, and in their race promising to increase carbon emissions to
“600 million metric tons in 2010,” citizens must remain optimistic that the two countries can
come together and end this terrible game of “chicken.”14 As Margaret J. Kim and Robert E.
Jones argue, “This global game of ‘chicken’ is a game that the world cannot afford to play.
5
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While the United States continues to drag its feet, knowing full well that China will not ‘blink
first,’ China’s emissions continue to grow at an alarming rate.”15 As Professor Harris says,
“The great challenge, and opportunity, China faces is to chart a development path that doesn’t
imitate the destructive example of developed Western countries.”16 The U.S. and China must
call a truce and together lead the world in creating a practical post-Kyoto framework.
This paper will discuss how the interplay between China and the U.S. will affect
mitigation in a Kyoto successor treaty. This paper argues that China and the U.S. must agree
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to eighty percent below 1990 levels by 2050.17 First, this
paper will discuss basic climate change science, focusing on what the experts say greenhouse
gases (including carbon dioxide) and temperature must be stabilized at as well as the
mitigation measures necessary to achieve those stabilization goals. Second, this paper will
summarize what happened at the Bali and Poznan conferences and how those two meetings
set the stage for Copenhagen in 2009. Third, this paper will outline the necessary framework
for mitigation in a Kyoto successor treaty. Fourth, this paper will address the challenges of
implementing a Kyoto successor treaty in the U.S. and China. Lastly, this paper will discuss
how the world, and in particular the U.S. and China, is reacting and could react to mitigating
climate change in light of the current economic crisis. With the recent approval of Todd
Stern as the U.S. Special Envoy for Climate Change and the March 2008 elevation of China’s
State Environmental Protection Agency into a Cabinet ministry, both nations are now in the
position to cooperate and lead the rest of the world in negotiating a successful Kyoto
successor treaty.18, 19
Climate Change Science—What The Experts Say
It is generally accepted in the academic community that humans have contributed
greatly to global warming and that “Global atmospheric concentrations of CO2, methane
(CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) have increased markedly as a result of human activities since
1750 and now far exceed pre-industrial values determined from ice cores spanning many
thousands of years.”20 According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),
“In order to stabilise the concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere, emissions would need to
peak and decline thereafter. The lower the stabilisation level, the more quickly this peak and
decline would need to occur.”21 The IPCC stresses that we must take action quickly. The
longer it takes us to initiate action, the harder it will be to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions
15
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at low levels: “Mitigation efforts over the next two to three decades will have a large impact
on opportunities to achieve lower stabilisation levels.”22
At a 2005 conference hosted by the United Kingdom (UK) Met Office in Exeter,
“preliminary findings were that a rise of 3 degrees Celsius (5.4 degrees Fahrenheit) relative to
pre-industrial levels may by well past the edge of the comfort zone.” 23 At the Exeter
meeting, scientists “strengthened a consensus that a 2 degrees Celsius (3.6 degrees
Fahrenheit) warming above pre-industrial levels, or about 1.2 degrees Celsius (2.1 degrees
Fahrenheit) above today’s global temperature, is the best goal for climate stabilization.” Both
NASA and the IPCC “have also endorsed the need to stop before warming by 2 degrees
Celsius.”24 In the scientific community, “the consensus is that the limit should be 400 to have
a good chance of restricting the global temperature rise to 2 degrees Celsius.”25
It its Fourth Assessment Report, the IPCC states that “limiting temperature increases
to 2°C above preindustrial levels can only be reached at the lowest end of the concentration
interval found in the scenarios of category I (i.e. about 450 ppmv CO2-eq using ‘best
estimate’ assumptions).”26 In category I scenarios, emissions must peak between 2000 and
2015 and the change in global emissions in 2050 must be between fifty and eighty-five
percent of 2000 levels. 27 Limiting the temperature increase to 2.4°C-2.8°C (category II)
would mean that emissions must peak between 2000 and 2020 and the change in global
emissions must be between thirty and sixty percent of 2000 levels.28 Limiting the temperature
increase to 2.8°C-3.2°C (category III) would mean that emissions must peak between 2010
and 2030 and the change in global emissions must be between five and thirty percent of 2000
levels.29
In a May 2008 letter, the Union of Concerned Scientists called for “reduc[ing]
emissions on the order of 80 percent below 2000 levels by 2050.” 30 The signatory scientists
called for the first step to be “reductions on the order of 15-20 percent below 2000 levels by
2020, which is achievable and consistent with sound economic policy.”31
The Road to Copenhagen: What Happened in Bali and Poznan
The Thirteenth Session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 13)/ the Third Session of the Meeting of
the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (COP/MOP 3) held December 3-15, 2007 in Bali, Indonesia
produced the Bali Roadmap. Bali saw the formation of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-
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term Cooperative Action under the Convention.32 The Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term
Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA) is known as the “UNFCCC track”
and runs parallel to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties
under the Protocol (AWG-KP), the “Kyoto Protocol track.” The creation of the new AWFLCA is vital to the negotiation of a post Kyoto successor treaty by Copenhagen in 2009: “The
key decision in Bali was the launch of a negotiating process under the Convention that will
now run in parallel with the Kyoto negotiations with the expectation that – although not
formally linked – the two tracks will converge in a comprehensive post-2012 agreement in
2009.”33 The two tracks must merge to create one cohesive regime.
At COP 13, both developed and developing nation parties adopted mitigation
measures for the first time. Developed nation parties committed to “Measurable, reportable
and verifiable nationally appropriate mitigation commitments or actions, including quantified
emission limitation and reduction objectives, by all developed country Parties, while ensuring
the comparability of efforts among them, taking into account differences in their national
circumstances.”34 Developing nation parties committed to “Nationally appropriate mitigation
actions by developing nation Parties in the context of sustainable development, supported and
enabled by technology, financing and capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and
verifiable manner.”35 Bali marked the first time that developing nations agreed to any kind of
binding mitigation measures under either the UNFCCC or Kyoto Protocol tracks.
The Fourteenth Session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 14)/ the Fourth Session of the Meeting of
the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (COP/MOP 4) held December 3-15, 2007 in Poznan, Poland
served mainly as a “pit stop” on the road to Copenhagen and “barely produced any
remarkable results.” 36 Largely due to the political situation in the United States, most
developing countries did not make significant moves in Poznan.37 Poznan lacked the sense of
urgency needed to lay an aggressive and attainable course on the road to Copenhagen. The
EU called for reductions on the part of both developed and developing countries but
developing countries called for “stronger support” from developed countries.38
In Poznan, the AWG-KP “reached no conclusions on the range of emission reductions
to be undertaken by developed countries.”39 Most were “unprepared” to negotiate without the
U.S. on board.40 The AWG-LCA managed to accomplish significantly more at Poznan than
the AWG-KP. The AWG-LCA “resolved to ‘shift into full negotiating mode in 2009’ ”41 and
“adopted a work program authorizing its chair to draft the documents needed to carry its

32
Pew
Center
on
Climate
Change,
Bali
Summary,
at
3,
available
at
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Pew%20Center_COP%2013%20Summary.pdf.
33
Ibid.
34
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference of the Parties, Thirteenth Session, Bali Action
Plan para. 1(b)(i), Decision 1/CP.13, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (March 14, 2008) available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/cop13/eng/06a01.pdf#page=3.
35
Ibid. at para. 1(b)(ii).
36
Pit Stop Poznan. An Analysis of Negotiations on the Bali Action Plan at the Stopover to Copenhagen.
Wuppertal
Institute
for
Climate,
Environment
and
Energy,
at
2,
available
at
http://www.wupperinst.org/uploads/tx_wibeitrag/Pit-Stop-Poznan.pdf.
37
Summary of the Fourteenth Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
and Fourth Meeting of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol: 1-12 December 2008, 12 EARTH NEGOTIATIONS
BULLETIN 395, available at http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12395e.pdf.
38
Pew
Center
on
Climate
Change,
Poznan
summary,
at
1-2,
available
at
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/PewCenterCOP14Summary.pdf.
39
Ibid. at 2.
40
Ibid.
41
Ibid.

210

work forward.”42 The documents are 1) “a document ‘describing areas of convergence in the
ideas and proposals of the Parties, exploring options for dealing with areas of divergence and
identifying any gaps that might need to be filled in reaching an agreed outcome;’ ” and 2) “a
negotiating text for consideration at the AWG-LCA’s second session next year, in June
[2009].” A disagreement also arose in Poznan as to the “kind of legal outcome aimed at in
Copenhagen.”43 The legal form of a Kyoto successor treaty will be addressed in the next
section.
Necessary Framework for Mitigation in a Kyoto Successor Treaty—The “Copenhagen
Protocol”
A mitigation framework for a Kyoto successor treaty must include several key components.
First, a Kyoto successor treaty must include all nations. Second, the reduction in greenhouse
gas emissions to eighty percent below 1990 levels by 2050 must be across the board and
cannot be based on a nation’s per capita emissions.44 Third, the treaty must take the form of a
new legal instrument under the UNFCCC that replaces the Kyoto Protocol rather than an
amendment to the Kyoto Protocol or a Meeting of the Parties (CMP) decision.45 The new
legal instrument, the “Copenhagen Protocol,” must incorporate Kyoto elements into the new
instrument. 46 However, elements of Kyoto that are not functioning properly should be
eliminated from the Copenhagen Protocol. Fourth, Annex I nations must establish a fund
solely to provide monetary aid to non-Annex I nations to achieve their mitigation
commitments. Fifth, the Copenhagen Protocol must establish a comprehensive enforcement
mechanism. This paper will focus on the basic framework for the mitigation aspects of the
Copenhagen Protocol. The mitigation framework proposed here is not meant to be
comprehensive.
An all-inclusive Kyoto successor treaty will give all nations the opportunity to sign on
and will tone down any anger or resentment nations could have about being left out of the
process. Kyoto critics endorse other approaches such as “bring[ing] together a more limited
number of major-emitting and like-minding countries.” 47 Others advocate that countries
should “make pledges of particular domestic measures.”48 Bringing together a smaller group
of the major polluters could potentially work only if it was part of the post-Kyoto mitigation
framework. One design for this smaller group “is an agreement among the dozen or so major
emitting countries—the United States, China, Europe, Russia, Japan, India, Indonesia, Brazil,
Australia, Canada, Mexico, Korea, South Africa, and perhaps a few other major countries—
in a regime to limit global GHG emissions.”49 A design of this sort will never work as part of
“a parallel regime in a plurilateral approach” because China will never sign onto anything
that interferes with the UNFCCC or Kyoto tracks.50 Any action that smaller groups take with
regard to the Copenhagen Protocol must complement rather than replace and official work
under the UNFCCC and more specifically, the AWG-KP or the AWG-LCA.
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Professor Prins argues that “the only way to save the Copenhagen meeting from
failure would be to shift away from the top-down approach of the Kyoto framework, and end
the quest for tighter emissions targets, closer timetables and more building regulations.”51
Prins’ recommendation for “end[ing] the quest for tighter emissions targets [and] closer
timetables” in Copenhagen contradicts the entire UNFCCC and Kyoto approach. The science
in the IPCC Fourth Assessment report clearly shows that we must act now. Completely
revamping our approach less than a year prior to Copenhagen is a recipe for disaster. Xie
Zhenhua, the minister and vice-director of China’s National Development and Reform
Commission (NDRC) has already warned that the Chinese will not shift away from “the topdown approach of the Kyoto framework:” “ ‘Any attempt to deviate from, breach or re-define
the Convention, or to deny the Kyoto Protocol, or to merge the Convention process with the
Kyoto Protocol process, will be detrimental, and will ultimately lead to a fruitless
Copenhagen Conference.’ ” With the proper technology transfer and significant monetary
aid, though, China may be willing to deny the Kyoto Protocol and merge the AWG-KP and
AWG-LCA tracks.
The reduction in greenhouse gas emissions to eighty percent below 1990 levels by
2050 must be across the board.52, 53 Reduction commitments cannot be based on a nation’s
per capita emissions. Basing reduction commitments on per capita emissions will actually
increase emissions. Professor McCubbin argues for China’s cap to be based on “greenhouse
gas emissions per unit of GDP.” 54 She argues that “this approach would allow China’s
economy to grow, but it would require its emissions to grow more slowly than if left
uncontrolled.”55
The Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period ends in 2012. The Copenhagen
Protocol must cover the time period from 2012 to 2050. The first commitment period for the
Copenhagen Protocol should begin in 2012 and go until 2020. This first commitment period
will be shorter than the other three commitment periods. The next three commitment periods
will run from 2020 to 2030, from 2030 to 2040, and from 2040 to 2050. The year 2030 will
serve as the official “midpoint” of the Copenhagen Protocol timetable.
This proposed framework is in keeping with the “A Shared Vision for Long-Term
Cooperative Action” (hereinafter “Shared Vision”) proposed by the AWG-LCA in documents
submitted in advance of the Bonn Climate Change Talks held March 29-April 8, 2009.56 This
Shared Vision contains “A Long-Term Global Goal for Emission Reductions.” 57 In
paragraph five, the Parties agree that 2050 “is an appropriate time frame for a long-term
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goal.”58 Proposals by the Parties include stabilization of GHG emissions “of around 450 ppm
carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2 eq) or 350 ppm CO2 eq;” limiting the global average
temperature increase to between 1.5°C and 2°C above pre-industrial levels; and
quantification of “GHG emission reductions at a global level,” reducing to “50 percent of
1990 levels, or without specifying the base year,” “reductions of between 75 and 85 percent
(including ranges within these figures) of 1990 levels;” and per capita GHG emission
reductions.59
During the first commitment period from 2012 to 2020, non-Annex I nations,
including China and India, will be allowed to increase their greenhouse gas emissions. After
the first commitment period, non-Annex I nations must begin to reduce their greenhouse gas
emissions. The Fourth IPCC report indicates that “global greenhouse gas emissions growth
needs to stop within the next 10-25 years, followed by a sharp decline.” 60 Non-Annex I
nations will still be expected to meet the target of an eighty percent reduction in greenhouse
gas emissions by 2050. Non-Annex I nations should be allowed to increase their greenhouse
gas emissions during the first commitment period to gain time to aggressively put in place
energy efficiency programs and new, clean technology. The new fund established under the
Copenhagen Protocol will assist non-Annex I nations in achieving these goals. Professor
McCubbin agrees that a cap on China’s greenhouse gas emissions must be “set above current
levels in order to allow for growth.”61 Most experts agree that worldwide greenhouse gas
emissions should peak by 2020 then must fall in order for emissions to stabilize at 400-450
ppm carbon dioxide equivalent and to cap warming at two degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels.
The Copenhagen Protocol must take the form of a new legal instrument under the
UNFCCC regime that incorporates Kyoto elements into the new instrument. The
Copenhagen Protocol should retain the following Kyoto elements: an emissions trading
scheme (often referred to as “cap-and-trade”) and the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM). The Copenhagen Protocol should eliminate Joint Implementation (JI). The
Copenhagen Protocol must also incorporate UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol principles such as
common but differentiated responsibilities and equity.
Kyoto’s emissions trading scheme should be continued in the Copenhagen Protocol
because it functions well and has established a carbon market. Article Seventeen of the
Kyoto Protocol sets out the emissions trading scheme. Article Seventeen “allows countries
that have emission units to spare—emissions permitted them but not ‘used’—to sell this
excess capacity to countries that are over their targets.”62 Article Seventeen created a carbon
market with carbon being tracked and traded as a new commodity.63 Replacing the emissions
trading scheme with a carbon tax “could congest an already difficult negotiation.”64
The Copenhagen Protocol must overhaul the CDM system because the CDM has lost
credibility in recent years. Ambassador Stuart Eizenstat agrees that “the CDM has not met
expectations that it would promote emission reducing investments throughout the developing
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world, and we now have an opportunity to revisit it.” 65 The CDM is defined in Article
Twelve of the Kyoto Protocol and “allows a country with an emission-reduction or emissionlimitation commitment under the Kyoto Protocol (Annex B Party) to implement an emissionreduction project in developing countries. Such projects can earn saleable certified emission
reduction (CER) credits, each equivalent to one tonne of CO2, which can be counted towards
meeting Kyoto targets.” 66 Essentially, developed nations are able to “[lower] their
greenhouse gas emissions by financing emission reduction projects in developing countries
where investment is cheaper.”67
CDM overhaul should include several key components. First, the new CDM should
mandate CDM project quotas for countries which have historically hosted fewer CDM
projects, such as many African nations. As of early March 2009, there were “850 clean
development mechanism projects in 49 developing countries but only 23 of those projects
[were] in Africa.”68 Second, Copenhagen negotiators must streamline and speed up the CDM
project approval process. Third, the new CDM should contain front-loaded time-limited
participation incentives to keep the CDM operational despite the economic crisis.
The Copenhagen Protocol should eliminate JI because it allows developed countries
to conduct projects in other developed countries and produces a lot of “hot air.”69 Article Six
of the Kyoto Protocol sets out the JI mechanism. Article Six “allows a country with an
emission reduction or limitation commitment under the Kyoto Protocol (Annex B Party) to
earn emission reduction units (ERUs) from an emission-reduction or emission removal
project in another Annex B Party, each equivalent to one tonne of CO2, which can be counted
towards meeting its Kyoto target.”70 JI is totally ineffective; it is simply a way for developed
countries to earn ERUs for less than it would have cost in their own respective countries. The
“benefited” developed country is receiving a benefit that it never needed anyway.
Article Three of the UNFCCC sets forth hortatory (“should”) guiding principles “for
actions by the parties to achieve the objective of the UNFCCC, including common but
differentiated responsibilities.” 71 The UNFCCC describes common but differentiated
responsibilities in terms of developed and developing nations and equity:
The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future
generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country
Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.72
In documents submitted in advance of the Bonn Climate Change Talks, the AWGLCA particularly focused on the principles of common but differentiated responsibilities and
equity in its “Shared Vision.” Two topics under this “Shared Vision” complement the
UNFCCC principles of common but differentiated responsibilities and equity:
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(a) Approaches to long-term cooperative action on the basis of equity and in
accordance with the provisions and principles of the Convention, in particular the principle of
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, taking into account
social and economic conditions and other relevant factors;
(g) The determination of developing countries to take nationally appropriate
mitigation actions (NAMAs) in the context of sustainable development and the determination
of developed countries to provide support in the form of technology, finance and capacitybuilding, all of the above in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner.73
The NAMAs, first proposed in Bali, help link the principles of common but differentiated
responsibilities and equity with a more specific mitigation strategy.
The Copenhagen Protocol must take form of a new legal instrument that replaces the
Kyoto Protocol rather than 1) “A COP decision addressing further actions under the
Convention; 2) “Adoption by the COP of an amendment to the UNFCCC or to an annex,
setting forth additional actions and/or commitments by UNFCCC parties;” or 3) “Adoption
by the COP of a new legal instrument that…supplements…the Kyoto Protocol.”74 Creating a
new legal instrument would enable nations that are not parties to Kyoto to sign the new
instrument and bypass Kyoto entirely. Although Chris Spence, the Deputy Director of
Reporting Services for the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) has
indicated that there is “no clear consensus” on the legal form that a future agreement will
take, Professor Bodansky proposes that: “A comprehensive outcome establishing a single
integrated climate regime would have several benefits.” 75 He logically connects a single
integrated climate regime with “adoption of a single new instrument under the Convention
(either a Convention amendment or a new protocol), which addressed actions and/or
commitments by both Kyoto Protocol parties and Convention parties that are not parties to
the Protocol.” Because all nations must meet the same emission reduction requirements,
there is no need to differentiate these commitments. Non-Annex I parties will be given extra
time and resources to achieve their emissions targets. Adding another annex will complicate
the situation.
The Copenhagen Protocol must establish a fund solely to assist Annex-I nations in
providing monetary aid to non-Annex I nations to help the non-Annex I nations achieve their
mitigation commitments.76 Developing nations will not sign onto the Copenhagen Protocol
without significant technology transfer and monetary aid. Providing significant funding to
non-Annex I nations will help enable them to meet emission reduction commitments of
eighty percent by 2050. This fund should be separate from the CDM.
The Copenhagen Protocol must correct the ineffective Kyoto Protocol compliance
system. The Kyoto Protocol compliance system only applies to Annex I nations, and does
not apply to all aspects of Kyoto. Kyoto has failed in part because: “Under Article 18 of the
Protocol, any compliance procedures entailing binding consequences must be adopted as an
amendment to the Protocol.”77 Article Twenty sets out procedural requirements for amending
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the Kyoto Protocol.78 Article Twenty states that parties should try to reach consensus on the
proposed amendment, but if consensus is not reached, “the amendment shall as a last resort
be adopted by a three-fourths majority vote of the Parties present and voting at the meeting.”
This means that if a nation decides it does not want to ratify an amendment, it can essentially
nullify the entire enforcement process.
The Copenhagen Protocol must contain comprehensive legally binding enforcement
mechanisms. The new enforcement mechanisms should apply to both Annex I and nonAnnex I nations and should impose penalties for noncompliance in every part of the
Copenhagen Protocol including any flexible mechanisms or funds. The new compliance
regime could build on the Expert Review Teams and Compliance Committee established
under Kyoto by the Marrakesh Accords.79 The roles of both entities would expand to cover
all signatory countries. The Copenhagen Protocol would need to establish new enforcement
bodies to monitor aspects not subject to enforcement under the Kyoto Protocol.
The Copenhagen Protocol must detach penalties under the enforcement regime from
any amendment process. Penalties must be negotiated and put into the actual original
document, not left incomplete for discussion later. Penalties for non-compliance could be
linked to each of the four commitment periods with penalties becoming more severe as 2050
approaches. Additional sanctions could include cutting off mitigation assistance funds to
developing nations for non-compliance.
China agrees that an enforcement mechanism is a necessary part of the Copenhagen
discussions. Su Wei, the Chinese delegation chief to the UN climate change talks in Bonn,
said that an “ ‘effective supervision mechanism’ should be set up to monitor the abovementioned technology transfer and funding.”80
While a number of potential approaches to a post Kyoto treaty have merit, many fail
to address what countries have said they will or will not do. There are some aspects of a
Kyoto successor treaty that nations may be willing to compromise on, but a viable solution
cannot ignore fundamental views on approaches to the successor treaty. Monetary aid and
technology transfer will assist in bringing some nations on board, but any successful Kyoto
successor treaty must follow the UNFCCC principles of common but differentiated
responsibilities and equity.
If We Build It, They Will Come
In its January 2009 report entitled A Roadmap for U.S.-China Cooperation on Energy and
Climate Change, the Pew Center on Global Climate Change proposed a global climate
change framework for a partnership between the U.S. and China:
…if human beings hope to avoid the worst consequences of global climate change,
the United States and China—respectively the world’s largest developed and
developing nations, the two largest energy consumers, and the two largest producers
of greenhouse gases—have no alternative but to become far more active partners in
developing low-carbon economies.
To prevail in such a common effort, both countries will need not only bold leadership
and a new set of national policies, but also a path-breaking cooperative agenda that
can be sustained over the long run. The advent of a new U.S. presidential
administration in Washington, D.C., coupled with a central leadership in Beijing that
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is increasingly aware of the destructive impact and long-term dangers of climate
change, presents an unparalleled opportunity for this new strategic partnership.81
The report first recommends that the U.S. and China have a summit between the two
leaders as soon as possible after Obama takes office to form a “U.S.-China Partnership on
Energy and Climate Change.”82 The partnership is to be directed by two parallel groups. The
U.S.-China high-level council will include high-ranking environment, energy, and finance
officials from both countries.83 The second tier of bilateral task forces will include senior
officials and independent government experts.84 Priority areas of collaboration will include:
1) deploying low-emissions coal technologies; 2) improving energy efficiency and
conservation; 3) developing an advanced electric grid; 4) promoting renewable energy; and 5)
quantifying emissions and financing low-carbon technologies.”85
The U.S. and China are the two countries best suited to form a partnership and take
the lead on curbing greenhouse gas emissions because both countries have a lot to gain, and
conversely, a lot to lose. The U.S. and China are inextricably tied together in the global
climate change conundrum: “For whether we choose to recognize it or not, these two
countries are both crucial in the effort to address climate change. Simply put, if these two
countries cannot find ways to bridge the long-standing divide on this issue, there will literally
be no solution.”86 It is time for the global game of “chicken” to be over. Unless the U.S. and
China can create adequate incentives, “the prospects for an adequate multilateral agreement
are dim. The post-Kyoto process does not appear to be developing fast enough among a
sufficient number of major emitters to avoid a doubling of atmospheric concentrations of
carbon dioxide from preindustrial levels.” 87 The U.S. and China must seize this unique
opportunity to create this partnership and show the rest of the globe they are serious about
global climate change and a Kyoto successor treaty.
The Time Is Now: Implementing The Copenhagen Protocol in The U.S. and China
Since the election of Barack Obama to the U.S. presidency, world leaders and global climate
change supporters have adopted a much more optimistic attitude towards a Kyoto successor
treaty. Americans feel relieved that Mr. Bush is now out of office and that the U.S. can move
forward and fulfill its leadership role in the global climate change debate. Mr. Bush “framed
his approach to global warming around two talking points: the uncertainties in forecasts of a
dangerously human–heated world and the certainty that economic harm would come from
mandatory cuts in emissions of heat-trapping gases.”88 The New York Times observes that
President Obama has completely gone in the other direction: “Mr. Obama has taken precisely
the opposite track. He spoke late last month of the specter of ‘violent conflict, terrible
storms, shrinking coastlines’ and other perils from unchecked warming, while pressing his
vision of prosperity rebuilt around clean cars and pollution-free power from the wind and
sun.”89 While Obama seems to be headed in the right direction, he still needs to educate some
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Americans “ ‘grappling with uncertain science and a grinding recession that work on longterm energy and climate security cannot be deferred until better times.’ ” 90 Some of that
convincing may need to be directed towards the U.S. Senate.
Under Article II of the U.S. Constitution, President Obama has the power to make
treaties, but “two thirds of the Senators present [must] concur.” 91 Three U.S. Senate
committees currently “all claim jurisdiction on climate change.”92 These committees are the
Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, the Senate Energy and Natural Resources
Committee, and the Senate Finance Committee. 93 These committees, as well as several
committees in the U.S. House of Representatives (House), are currently working on climate
change legislation. 94 In the Senate, there is potential for the more pro-environment
Environment and Public Works Committee to produce a bill which not be able to garner
support in the full Senate.95 It is doubtful that the Senate will be able to produce a climate
change bill this year, which does not bode well for the Senate passing a Kyoto successor
treaty.
A U.S. domestic climate change bill could originate in either the House or the Senate,
but the Senate must pass a Kyoto successor treaty with a two-thirds vote. The timing this
year will probably be such that neither the House nor the Senate will produce a climate
change bill before Copenhagen. Even if a Kyoto successor treaty is produced in Copenhagen,
there may be further delay before the U.S. will ratify the treaty. The Senate may insist that
domestic climate change legislation is in place before signing onto a Kyoto successor treaty.
In his campaign for the American presidency, President Obama promised to
“implement an economy-wide cap-and-trade program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
80% percent by 2050.”96 Since taking office earlier this year, “President Obama has radically
shifted the global equation, placing the United States at the forefront of the international
climate effort and raising hopes that an effective international accord might be possible.”97
On January 26, 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced the appointment of Todd
Stern as the Special Envoy for Climate Change. 98 In making the announcement, Clinton
emphasized that the new administration is committed to crafting a new global climate change
plan for the U.S.:
And that is just a start. As the President has made clear, he is committed to enacting a
far-reaching new energy and climate plan. As we take steps at home, we will also vigorously
pursue negotiations, those sponsored by the United Nations and those at the sub-global,
regional, and bilateral level that can lead to binding international climate agreements. No
solution is feasible without all major emitting nations joining together and playing an
important part.99
Steven Chu, the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Energy, has now confirmed that
the U.S. plans on being a leader in Copenhagen: “ ‘President Obama has made it clear that
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the US should act first…Using China as a reason not to act is no longer an option.’ ”100 Even
with the current economic crisis, the outlook of the new administration towards a Kyoto
successor treaty seems to be one of optimism.
At the end of January and within days of President Obama’s inauguration, Senator
John Kerry and former Vice-President Al Gore began to lobby the Senate on a Kyoto
successor treaty. Senator Kerry, former Vice-President Gore, and Mr. Alden Meyer with the
Union of Concerned Scientists sat down with Richard Harris of National Public Radio News
(NPR News) who spoke with them about a Kyoto successor treaty and what must happen this
year for Copenhagen to be a success.101
Richard Harris: Massachusetts Democrat John Kerry, who chairs the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, reminded his colleagues the new treaty will be negotiated in December
of this year.
Senator John Kerry (Democrat, Massachusetts): That means there is no time to waste.
We must learn from the mistakes of Kyoto, and we must make Copenhagen a success.
…
Mr. Gore: Recent statements by Chinese leaders have made it very clear that they are
changing, and changing rapidly.
…
Harris: China has been reluctant to make binding promises until the United States
does. And since the U.S.
wants promises from China up-front, it’s a bit of a game of
chicken at this point. Meyer says unfortunately, a lot of senators don’t realize that
developing nations are doing as much as they are.
…
Harris: Yesterday, Al Gore started selling members of the Senate on the need to act
and act fast. And while he had a very sympathetic audience at the Foreign Relations
Committee, it takes 67 senators to ratify a treaty, and it’s clear that there’s a lot more
convincing to do.102
China also seems to be turning a corner, but China’s turning the corner will depend on
U.S. participation in Copenhagen and the meetings leading up to Copenhagen throughout this
year. Even if the U.S. does manage to get China on board, implementation of the
Copenhagen Protocol will be difficult in China: “Even if China were to adopt significant and
binding GHG emissions, there are serious concerns about how they would be implemented
and whether such targets could be effectively achieved.”103 Professor Yang identifies two
barriers to the implementation of a binding GHG emissions scheme: “First, China’s
continued overwhelming focus on economic development objectives, which runs through
China’s climate programs, raises questions as to whether its policies can promote
environmental sustainability. Second, the weakness of China’s existing environmental
regulatory infrastructure and legal institutions put into doubt its ability to limit GHG
emissions effectively.”104 Professor McCubbin echoes many of Professor Yang’s concerns:
...this article focuses in particular on three key points, often overlooked in discussions
about China’s role in addressing climate change, that will be critical to those negotiations:
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(1) the synergy between China’s domestic environmental goals and the international
community’s objectives, (2) the need to harmonize environmental protection with China’s
continued economic growth, and (3) the importance of improving China’s rule of law in
order to meet the environmental aims.105
The Cable News Network (CNN) documentary “Planet in Peril” shows the situation
powerfully and vividly. As the documentary team approached the outskirts of the city of
Tialinjin, “brown stinking water from local chemical factories was flowing into ditches near
the [Heilongjiang] river. We learned quickly that pollution is a touchy subject in China. As
we left the river, word of our presence started to get around. So it didn’t take long for the
police to find us.”106 The police wanted to see the documentary team’s passports, find out
what they were doing, and question them.107 When the documentary team knocked on the
mine director’s office at nearby Dabaoshan mine, he refused to answer any questions.108
Despite potential problems implementing the Copenhagen Protocol at the provincial
and local levels, the national government in Beijing has shown that it can act swiftly and
effectively on environmental matters. The “plastic bag story” is one of the best examples of
Beijing’s unique ability to quickly effect environmental change. As Thomas Friedman puts
it, “One morning in late 2007 China’s shopkeepers woke up and found that the State Council
had announced that beginning June 1, 2008, all supermarkets, department stores, and shops
would be prohibited from giving out free plastic bags, in order to discourage the use of these
petroleum-based products. In the future, stores would have to charge customers for them.”109
Friedman asks “What would be so bad? China? Just for one short day?”110 The U.S. could
learn an awful lot by being China “for just one short day.”111
A binding enforcement mechanism in the Copenhagen Protocol would enable the
international community to more effectively “push China for legal reforms.”112 Professor
McCubbin suggests using “both the promise of aid and the threat of sanctions to bring those
commitments to fruition.” 113 New York Times columnist Paul Krugman also thinks that
rogue greenhouse gas emitting nations will face serious consequences in the near future:
“Sooner than most people think, countries that refuse to limit their greenhouse gas emissions
will face sanctions, probably in the form of taxes on their exports.”114
A Kyoto Successor Treaty and the Economic Crisis
Most commentators argue that a Kyoto successor treaty should not be affected by the current
economic crisis. Many argue that the economic crisis may help the “green revolution.”
Developing countries especially do not want climate change efforts compromised:
Costa Rica, for the G-77/China, said efforts to address climate change should not be
compromised by the current financial crisis. She also noted that adaptation and mitigation
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must be addressed as equal priorities, deep emission cuts should primarily be undertaken
domestically by developed countries, and nationally appropriate mitigation actions for
developing countries should be considered in the context of sustainable development.”115
London’s The Independent argues that the environment and green technology could
be the answer to pull us out of this economic crisis: “…the environment ought to be at the
centre of attempts to pull us out of this slump. Unemployed labour should be put to work on
schemes that help conserve household energy. And if governments invest in renewable
energy schemes while resources are relatively cheap, they can use this downturn to lay the
foundations for future green growth.”116
Not acting now on climate change could make the economic situation even worse
down the line. The Stern Report, released in October 2006 by the British Chancellor of the
Exchequer “estimated that the future adverse consequences of climate change could drain as
much as 5% of the global gross domestic product (GDP) in the coming years, whereas
immediate, aggressive steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions would cost only 1% if global
GDP.”117
Conclusion—“We Have Exactly Enough Time—Starting Now.”118
China and the U.S. must agree to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to eighty percent below
1990 levels by 2050. A Kyoto successor treaty must employ a top-down approach that
includes all nations, must contain across the board cuts, and cannot base emissions reductions
on per capita emissions. If emissions cuts are based on per capita emissions, China will still
be able to increase its emissions and the treaty will be a failure. The largest polluters, China
and the U.S., must take a leadership role in the post-Kyoto regime. China and the U.S. must
form a partnership as the Pew Center document A Roadmap for U.S.-China Cooperation on
Energy and Climate Change suggests. China and the U.S. cannot allow their respective
alliances and national interests affect their commitments to the emission reduction levels a
post-Kyoto treaty must have.
“There is no time to waste. The most risky thing we can do is do nothing,” wrote the
Union of Concerned Scientists in its May 2008 letter.119 The question is: if the scientists are
so concerned about global climate change, then why are the rest of us not? China and the
U.S. are now the top two emitters of greenhouse gases in the world. If China and the U.S.
cannot work together to help craft a Kyoto successor treaty, then there is no hope.
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